# Beating International Terrorism

## An Action Strategy for Preemption and Punishment

*Revised Edition*

*by*

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Cover: Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia, and the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

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This edition is dedicated to:
Col Donald D. Stevens, USAF, Retired
A warrior, a scholar, a leader, and a gentleman
who inspired and supported me in the continuing battle for
innovation in the realm of doctrine, policy, and strategy
against the forces of conventional wisdom.
and
To those who lost their lives in the
Murrah Building attack, the survivors,
and those who came to comfort and aid them.
May the work of the Oklahoma City National
Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism
honor them by assisting democratic societies
in combating terrorism.

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## *About the Author*

Dr. Stephen Sloan, professor of political science at the University of Oklahoma, received his MA and PhD degrees at New York University. While on leave from the University of Oklahoma, he was a senior associate at Booz, Allen, and Hamilton, Inc., where he was in charge of the firm's counterterrorism practice. Prior to that he was a senior research fellow at Air University's Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Doctor Sloan engaged in his initial fieldwork in the Republic of Indonesia, in 1965–66. In 1972–73 he was a Fulbright professor at Tribhuvan University in Nepal. He is a member of the steering committee and is the first visiting fellow of the Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism.

Professor Sloan has lectured at the National War College and the Army War College. He has conducted more than 16 simulations of terrorist incidents with concerned personnel and units in the United States and overseas. He has also conducted crisis management workshops for multinational corporations and for the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Professor Sloan's articles have been syndicated by the New York Times News Service and published by the International Association of Chiefs of Police and by scholarly and popular journals.

Dr. Sloan is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence. In addition to *Beating International Terrorism: An Action Strategy for Preemption and Punishment,* he has written *A Study in Political Violence: The Indonesian Experience* and co-edited with Richard H. Shultz Jr. *Responding to the Terrorist Threat: Security and Crisis Management.* He has also authored *Simulating Terrorism* and *The Pocket Guide to Safe Travel;* co-authored with Harry Pizer *Corporate Aviation Security: The Next Frontier in Aerospace Operations;* and co-edited with Edwin G. Corr *Low-Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World.* Dr. Sloan's latest book, co-edited with Sean Anderson, is *Historical Dictionary of Terrorism,* published by Scarecrow Press in 1995.

# *Foreword*

The face of terrorism has changed considerably in the 13-plus years since *Beating International Terrorism* was first published. Whereas we once considered terrorism to be primarily a tool of our archenemies in the Soviet Union, it currently has many faces and is much harder to fight.

With the breakdown of the Soviet Union, there is no superpower counterpoise to the United States. People, and states, with perceived grievances against us are attacking in the only way they dare: with terrorist tactics. Terrorist groups proliferate, and the threat is more ambiguous and more complicated. More state sponsors have entered the field, and so have groups without the backing of any government—for example, criminals who are out for monetary rather than political gains.

Terrorist groups now are typically smaller and harder to detect. They may have no hierarchy as such, but they can coordinate their actions by means of the Internet. This makes them harder for intelligence services to penetrate. But in light of the growing easy availability of weapons of mass destruction—particularly biological ones—prior knowledge and effective action may be even more important to protect our nation.

With the publication of this revised edition, Dr. Stephen Sloan, an internationally recognized expert on the subject, has taken a fresh look at the terrorist-fighting strategy he proposed in 1986 while serving a two-year tour with Air University's Center for (now College of) Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education. He finds that although his original proposal for fighting terrorists in their own nests was sound for the time, the present-day situation calls for a much more stringent and long-term approach involving information warfare, special operations capability, and international cooperation.

Dr. Sloan finds that, even faced with these new threats, US efforts against terrorism are blunted by bureaucratic infighting and turf battles. The question continues: Is terrorism a criminal

act or an act of war? How we fight it depends on how that question is answered. He believes our efforts are still essentially reactive, and while we are learning to meet the challenge, the learning curve is much too slow. We hope this book will promote continued thought and discussion in the still very real "war in the shadows."

JAMES L. RUTTLER JR.
Colonel, USAF
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Research and Education

# *Prologue*

The initial study of *Beating International Terrorism: An Action Strategy for Preemption and Punishment* was published in 1986. The nearly 14 years that have passed since then have witnessed profound events that have altered the international political landscape. Moreover, these changes may also have a global impact as we enter into the uncertainty of a new millennium.

In reassessing the study I have found that there is both continuity and change in the dark landscape of terrorism. This prologue addresses the changes—both anticipated and unanticipated by the author—that have impacted the views developed in the initial study. In the epilogue I address where the "action strategy" has met the test of time and where it has fallen victim to the rapid and fundamental transition that characterizes current international affairs. I then seek to adjust the action strategy to meet the challenges created by a new threat environment. As in the first study, "The suggestions are directed to those people who may be called upon to direct US offensive forces in a very real if undeclared war, war in the shadows—the war against terrorism."[1]

It is humbling to engage in a reassessment of an earlier study. The process serves to underscore how difficult it is to evolve policies, doctrines, and strategies that can stand the test of time. The challenge may be particularly onerous in the clandestine and convoluted world of terrorism where one looks through the glass darkly. For, if there is a "fog of war" there is most certainly a "smog of terrorism." That smog may have led to miscalculations by the author, but they are miscalculations shared by many scholars, policy makers, and quasi-seers who failed to discern various broader changes in the political and technological global arena. Three miscalculations in particular have had a major impact on reevaluating the characteristics of terrorism and the concomitant means of combating it.

In the first place, when the study was written the cold war had become intensified as the result of the pronouncements of a president—Ronald Reagan—who modified the classic policy

of containment to a more dynamic and outreaching offensive against the "evil empire." Because of this policy shift, Washington was engaged in implementing its own form of proxy or surrogate warfare against Moscow in Central America, Afghanistan, and other strategic areas. A renewed activist foreign policy, which included the massive buildup of American forces, started a process that sought to banish the Vietnam syndrome. In this activist policy, international terrorism was largely seen to be a form of proxy war that was particularly effectively employed by Moscow and its client states. Although senior intelligence officials and academic specialists rejected the contention that Moscow was the controller of international terrorism, such books as Claire Sterling's *The Terror Network* were cited to illustrate that the Soviet hand was involved in many acts and campaigns of terrorism as part of a strategy to subvert the will of the Western Alliance and promote instability throughout the third world.[2]

Yet, at the same time, the focus on superpower competition in which not only terrorism but also state-sponsored terrorism was part of a global strategy provided an outward coherence for those who sought to explain the significance of terrorism as an integral part of Soviet strategy in the context of the cold war. But the outward coherence that could be used to provide the framework to understand and combat terrorism would be destroyed as a result of the largely unforeseen remarkable and rapid disintegration of the Soviet Union, perhaps best manifested by the breakdown of the Berlin Wall. With the end of the cold war and the emergence of the United States as the major military superpower came a whole new set of conditions that not only would transform the cold war into the New World Order but would lead to a "new world disorder." In this highly unstable setting the coherence of the balance of "nuclear terrorism" between Moscow and Washington would be replaced by a more ambiguous conflict environment. In this new environment it would be more difficult to define who were the terrorists and what their goals were, much less how the United States could combat them.

In the second place, when the study was written the following statement was valid: "Terrorism is still not viewed by the public as a serious threat to national security and one

that requires decisive action. Terrorism is still primarily perceived to be a form of violence that happens to other people in other countries."[3] But two events literally brought the war home: the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York on 26 February 1993 and the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on 19 April 1995. The World Trade Center incident was the first massive terrorist attack in the United States. The impact of the attack—despite its magnitude—was somewhat mitigated to the American public because it happened on one of the coasts where such activities were, to some degree, expected and because it involved "foreign" terrorists. The second bombing, however, broke the insularity of those in the interior of the country. For, if a city in the "heartland" could be subject to attack not only by homegrown terrorists but in the person of a young man who had served with distinction in the GuIf War, any town or city could be vulnerable. In many ways the political and psychological shockwaves that moved outward from Oklahoma had more of an impact than those that moved inward from New York City.

The impact of the second attack had particular meaning to the author. I have been studying terrorism for over 25 years, and one of my earliest monographs in 1980 was a study titled *Terrorism Preparedness on the State and Local Level: An Oklahoma Perspective*.[4] When the study was published, the attitude on the part of many of the informed public reflected the prevailing attitudes. "Is it necessary? It won't happen here." But that attitude, that innocence or ignorance, would give way to a new reality in the face of 168 deaths, over 800 injured people, and the trauma to a community that is still undergoing a healing process. I would also add that while my concern about domestic acts was real, how could I anticipate that the most lethal act of terrorism in the United States at the time would take place only 12 blocks from my house? And how could I anticipate that I would be spending the next five days on-site seeking to help the public understand the nature of terrorism? The tragedy also led to my commitment to help develop and participate in the Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism as a means

of identifying and developing appropriate policies to meet future threats.

The third change was technological in nature, and its future impact may be the most difficult to discern or counter. When I wrote the early draft of *Beating International Terrorism,* I relied on yellow pad and pen, or typewriter. It was only later in my first year at the Center for (now College of) Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (CADRE) that I acquired a Macintosh, which at the time was more sophisticated than the government-issued personal computers used by my colleagues in the military. How could we know that in the course of the next one and one-half decades we would experience not only a revolution in computer technology but the transformation of the Internet from a tool used by the military and scientific community to the most rapidly growing mode of contemporary communication of data (if not of knowledge production)? However, in *Beating International Terrorism*, there were areas of technological innovation that I was sensitive to. I was concerned about the impact of technological change on terrorists' weaponry long before the term *weapons of mass destruction* (WMD) became part of the public lexicon of threats. Moreover, I did emphasize that with the introduction of commercial use of jet aircraft into the transportation system we had witnessed the development of "nonterritorial terrorism." Perpetrators could seize aircraft flying at over 500 miles an hour at 30,000 feet and, by operating in the medium of the aerospace, ignore the arbitrary boundaries of nation-states.[5] Furthermore, I recognized that terrorists could spread their message of fear and intimidation via the medium of television; but nowhere did I recognize the profound impact of the Internet, where cyberspace and the World Wide Web would extend and enhance the field of operations and capabilities of current and future terrorists.

These three changes, along with other developments, have made me reconsider the major elements of the "action strategy" I formulated in 1984–85. In the epilogue to this edition I suggest which of my conclusions may have stood the test of time and which have not. Even though I have learned painful lessons about the dangers of suggesting policies, strategies, and doctrine based on the always imperfect and

incomplete understanding of current and particularly future developments, I then suggest what measures should be considered to meet the always changing but enduring threat of terrorism. In effect, I push the envelope, but hopefully at my academic peril and not the readers'.

## Notes

1. Stephen Sloan, *Beating International Terrorism* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1986), xvii.
2. Claire Sterling, *The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Reader's Digest Press, 1981).
3. *Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force Report on Combating Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986), 2.
4. Michael McEwen and Stephen Sloan, *Terrorism Preparedness on the State and Local Level: An Oklahoma Perspective*, Clandestine Technology and Tactics Series (Gaithersburg, Md.: The International Association of Chiefs of Police), 1981.
5. Stephen Sloan, *The Anatomy of Non-Territorial Terrorism: An Analytical Essay*, Clandestine Tactics and Technology Series (Gaithersburg, Md.: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1978).

## *Foreword to the First Edition*

Terrorism has become the scourge of the 1980s. It has spread worldwide as independent political groups and minor states attempt to press their internal and international claims against the establishment. And, as Dr. Sloan notes in his preface, the struggle against terrorism is not going well.

This study proposes a bold new approach to the problem which includes the involvement of the United States military in preemptive operations. Such an approach differs radically from past policies and will certainly be very controversial. However, it does provide a basis for the discussion of new ideas badly needed to counteract this sinister, protracted, global war being fought in the shadows.

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[March 1986]

# *Preface*

The war against terrorism is not going well. Despite the bold pronouncements by the current administration, the United States essentially reacts—and often, badly—to attacks on its citizens and interests overseas. To the American public the coverage of such incidents has often projected an image of a government whose strong rhetoric to bring the war home against terrorists and their sponsor states has not been translated to meaningful action. Equally alarming is the fact that the media, rightly or wrongly, has also projected to foreign audiences the image of an often truculent and self-righteous superpower that is ineffective in countering skilled and determined adversaries who have taken the offensive in an increasingly violent form of armed conflict.

While these images may not be correct, they do highlight an unpleasant reality. Despite the bold policy statements, those who engage in attacks on the United States have carried out their operations with relative impunity. Furthermore, despite the proliferation of security measures and increased training in counterterrorist tactics, despite its stated desire to go on the offensive, Washington still finds itself in an essentially passive and reactive posture.

While there are a variety of reasons for this reactive posture, there is a central omission in the US desire to engage the terrorists offensively. This omission is the absence of a systematic doctrine to counter terrorism in general and, more specifically, a doctrine of terrorism preemption that can form the foundation for developing the necessary capabilities and policies to take the initiative away from the terrorists.

To those who are understandably concerned with the pressing operational requirements of responding to immediate threats or acts of terrorism, a discussion of doctrine may appear to be a luxury that cannot be considered by policy makers, officials, and officers who live in what they view to be "the real world." But unless doctrinal issues are addressed, Washington will continue essentially to react to short-term crises instead of developing the capacity to engage in both

short-term operations and long-term campaigns against the practitioners of modern terrorism.

As we shall see, terrorism can be viewed to be a form of criminality, an aspect of intense political competition and subversion, a manifestation of the changing nature of warfare, or indeed a new form of warfare. Depending on the perspective, one can stress the importance of the law enforcement function, the use of diplomacy, the crucial role of the intelligence community, or the requirement to engage in military action against terrorists and their sponsors. Unfortunately, until now the use of military force has been considered only as a last-resort option in response to an ongoing incident. Moreover, discussing retaliation after the fact continues to generate more heat than light in the ongoing debate of how the United States should combat terrorism.

The reluctance to use the military option to reactive missions, much less in preemptive ones, is a ramification of a fundamental omission in developing a meaningful capability to engage the terrorists. That is, despite the call for concerted forceful action against terrorists on the part of the current political leadership, terrorism is still not viewed by various civilian policy makers in general and by the military in particular to be a form of warfare that requires action by the military services. If there has not been a counterterrorism doctrine, and more specifically a doctrine of terrorism preemption, it is in large part because the services are unwilling to accept the view that terrorism is a new form of warfare that requires a military doctrine to combat it. Various military officers have dodged the issue altogether by suggesting that they cannot be involved in formulating counterterrorism or terrorism preemption doctrine unless there is guidance from the civilian leadership. One can suggest, however, that this may be a convenient means whereby the military can avoid facing the disquieting fact that they may not have the desire or capability to engage in this new form of warfare. The senior officers and officials in the defense establishment would perhaps rather fight the old wars or hopefully be prepared to fight the most unlikely type of future wars. But even as they talk, the terrorists have already declared a war on and initiated action against the United

States and its allies. Therefore, like it or not, the military must evolve doctrine that will enable it, along with the law enforcement community, the foreign policy establishment, and the intelligence community, to take an active and, when necessary, a preeminent role in using the tactics and strategies of the art of war not only to respond to but to take the initiative against those who are now practicing terroristic warfare. Indeed, it is an obligation of the services to develop the necessary doctrine and force for use if and when Washington and the public call upon them to search out and destroy an increasingly dangerous and sophisticated enemy in a global theater of operations.

This is not to suggest that such a doctrine should deal solely with the use of armed force. Since terrorism has many characteristics, is fought on many fronts, and is constantly changing, the military must work very closely with all those organizations and agencies responsible for combating terrorism. However, this study posits the view that the military, like it or not, must provide the doctrinal leadership in what has become a very real war.

The ensuing pages present a discussion of how such a doctrine can be evolved and implemented into a framework for action. Neither the discussion nor the framework should be taken literally. They are primarily meant as a base point for further necessary discussion on an area of investigation that largely has been ignored because of a concern over immediate exigencies. Furthermore, the framework does not provide specific operational requirements to engage effectively in terrorism preemption. Such a discussion falls within the realm of those with the operational experience within both the intelligence community and the services who are capable of planning and conducting the necessary operations and campaigns. Moreover, even if the author were capable of engaging in such a discussion, given its sensitive nature, it would hardly be appropriate to deal with the operational arts in an open publication.

Finally, this study relates both doctrine and capabilities—present and future—to a brief evaluation of existing policy. The policy dimensions of course are vital, for in the public discussion in Washington insufficient attention is given to the new reality:

The military must learn to fight a new form of warfare. It may not be the type of war they would prefer to fight, or a war of their making, but it is a real and ongoing war.

This study is written primarily for senior- and middle-level officials and officers who will be responsible for conducting the war against terrorism if and when they are called upon to do so. The author deeply appreciates the opportunity to conduct his research at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (CADRE), Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. His association with CADRE has given him the opportunity to gain insights through discussions with dedicated officers from all of the services who have shared knowledge and viewpoints that are not readily available in the academic community. In turn, the author hopes that his perspective as an academic with operational and policy concerns dealing with terrorism can assist those who must engage the adversary by providing a different viewpoint that may help focus on the measures necessary to bring the war home to the terrorists.

The author wishes to acknowledge the contributions and support of the following people: Col Donald D. Stevens, commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education; Col Dennis M. Drew, director, Airpower Research Institute; Col Keith W. Geiger, chief, Airpower Doctrine Division; and Lt Col Fred J. Reule, deputy director for research and chief, Command Research Division. Special thanks to Lt Col Jerome W. Klingaman, USAF, Retired, for his insights on low-intensity conflict, and Col James P. Nance for introducing me to the complexities of special operations; and finally, to my editor, Thomas E. Mackin, for his great assistance in revising the manuscript and to the personnel of the Production Division for their efforts in preparing my study for publication.

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# *Introduction*

The modern age of terrorism was ushered in by the massacre of 11 Israeli athletes at the Olympic Games in Munich in 1972. Since that time the fleeting electronic images of hooded terrorists holding hostages and authorities at bay have been projected on the television screen with depressing regularity. The skyjackings, bombings, hostage takings, assassinations, and other acts of carnage continue to seize the world's headlines and reinforce a public perception that the international community is unwilling or unable to respond to—much less take the initiative against—those who are engaging in an increasingly destructive assault on the fragile civil order.

Unfortunately, that perception is essentially correct. Despite general statements of condemnation, the drafting of treaties, and other diplomatic initiatives, a unified international approach to combat terrorism is not even remotely in sight. As the bloodletting continues, the semantic battle over what constitutes terrorism often takes precedence over concrete action to combat it.

On the regional level the responses to terrorism have been more encouraging. Cooperation has taken place, particularly between the United States and its Western allies. The sharing of intelligence and the refinement of security measures to prevent or respond to incidents has increased. But the cooperation has rarely resulted in concerted unified action against terrorists and, when appropriate, their sponsor states.

When there have been successful actions against terrorists, as in the case of Entebbe or Mogadishu, such successes were primarily the result of the resolve of individual states not to give in to terrorist blackmail. Experience sadly confirms that in the struggle against terrorism, each government in the final analysis must depend on its own will and resources in responding to terrorist attacks against its citizens and interests.

The United States's record in meeting the challenges posed by terrorism is undistinguished. The brief moment of national

euphoria that resulted from the interception of the aircraft carrying the perpetrators of the *Achille Lauro* affair in 1985 and the bombing of Libya in 1986 cannot obscure the fact that America's own war on terrorism has been characterized primarily by a national sense of helplessness and rage during and after each incident. The seizure of the American Embassy in Iran, the bombing and resultant loss of 241 lives at the Marine Landing Team Headquarters in Beirut, and the continuing assaults on citizens and interests overseas have left scars on the national psyche.

Since President Nixon, the official policy of no concessions to terrorists' demands has been violated in incident after incident. The current administration has maintained the same fiction, as witness the negotiations and concessions that led to the freeing of the passengers on TWA Flight 847 in Lebanon in 1985. Yet, President Reagan and a number of his senior advisors have stated publicly that they will take an even stronger position against international terrorism than previous administrations. Bold rhetoric has been enunciated, including the call for an "active strategy" and "preemptive measures" against "state sponsored terrorism." Yet current programs to combat terrorism remain essentially defensive and reactive with emphasis still being placed on expensive target-hardening programs and the refinement of crisis management techniques.

The reasons for this reactive and defensive stance are complex and interrelated. At the most senior official level, there are still no consistent long-term policies. Each situation determines the response, and even if military action has been taken it has only been initiated after the terrorists have struck. Furthermore, the memory of the abortive Iranian hostage rescue attempt raises serious questions concerning the ability of the United States to react to, much less go on the offensive against, the terrorists. With each new crisis the same scenario is played out with little variation in theme. The concern over the fate of the hostages, heightened by extensive media coverage, leads to drawn-out negotiation instead of effective military action against the perpetrators. The lack of policies and action is also the result of the fact that the so-called war on terrorism often degenerates into a partisan

debate within Congress. Polemics over “left wing terrorists” and “right wing freedom fighters” have promoted political disunity in the face of skillful and determined adversaries. Finally—and perhaps most fundamentally—despite the outcry that accompanies each incident, terrorism is still not viewed by the public as a serious threat to national security and one that requires decisive action. Terrorism is still primarily perceived to be a form of violence that happens to other people in other countries. The general climate of opinion does not provide the type of support that is necessary if the war is to be brought home against terrorism.

But even if the resolve developed within the political leadership and the public not only to react strongly but indeed to seize the initiative against terrorists and their state sponsors, it is by no means clear whether the military—who might be called on to engage in offensive preemptive operations and campaigns against terrorists—would be capable of carrying out such missions. The uncertainty is based in part on whether the services, individually and jointly, have the capability to take the offensive. But, more significantly, the uncertainty is predicated on a more basic question: Does the military have a counterterrorism doctrine, a doctrine that can provide the basis for the development of the necessary forces and strategies to take the initiative in both short-term operations and long-term campaigns against enemies who are growing in strength and sophistication? This study takes the position that present doctrine associated with combating terrorism is significantly flawed, that it is essentially reactive in nature, and consequently cannot be used effectively as the foundation for the development of the necessary organizations and forces that must be created if the cycle of crisis and reaction is ever to be broken. It discusses the major elements required to develop a doctrine that can assist the services in bringing the war home against the terrorists if and when they are called upon to do so by the political leadership and the American people.

Chapter 1, “A Matter of Definition,” presents the major characteristics of modern terrorism and discusses how they have been transformed by changes in technology and in the international system into a potent weapon of political,

psychological, and armed conflict that has yet to be fully appreciated by the military establishment. Chapter 2, “A Matter of Doctrine,” suggests that current concepts are inadequate in laying the groundwork for an offensive capability. It then discusses how a new conceptualization can provide the basis for preemptive military initiatives against terrorism. Chapter 3, “Force and Target Selection,” addresses how different types of doctrine can drive the acquisition of the kinds of forces capable of taking the offensive against terrorists and their sponsor states. Chapter 4, “Policy Dimensions: Recognition, Resolve, and Action” presents an analytical framework for the selection and use of existing forces as well as the development of new forces against different types of terrorist targets. Chapter 5, “Toward an Active Strategy,” suggests changes required before policy makers can develop or implement a counterterrorism capability. The suggestions are directed to those people who may be called on to direct US offensive forces in the very real, if undeclared, war in the shadows—the war against terrorism. Chapter 6, “The Vice President’s Task Force,” is a kind of postscript to the first edition, concerning findings released after completion of the original study.

18. Jerome W. Klingaman, "The Definition of Low-Intensity Conflict and Its Relation to US Defense Capabilities," in *Air Power for Counterinsurgency,* an unpublished manuscript, 9.

19. As taken from the title of the book *Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism,* by Claire Sterling (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Reader's Digest Press, 1981). The author does not suggest that there is a monolithic network controlled by the Soviet Union. However, she effectively shows the complicated linkages among various groups and Moscow's involvement with them.

20. Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, *Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984), 16.

21. Ibid., 33.

22. Thomas Perry Thornton, "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation," *Internal War,* ed. Harry Eckstein (New York: Free Press, 1986), 123.

23. For a discussion of how the development of contemporary terrorism is a manifestation of the technological impact that is transforming the international political arena, and for a description of "armed diplomacy," see Stephen Sloan, "International Terrorism: Conceptual Problems and Implications," *Journal of Thought* 17, no. 2 (Summer 1982).

24. Jenkins, *New Modes of Conflict,* 2.

**Notes**

1. H. H. A. Cooper, *Evaluating the Terrorist Threat, Principles of Applied Risk Assessment,* Clandestine Tactics and Technology Series (Gaithersburg, Md.: The International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1974), 4. Terrorism always poses an unacceptable challenge to the principles on which organized society rests, for those acting in this way seek to arrogate to themselves, and use in perverse ways, powers exclusively reserved to the state. Terrorism as an autonomous concept manifests itself through the distinctive deployment of a variety of criminal acts calculated to harm human life, property, and other interests.

2. Ibid.

3. National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, *Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), 3.

4. Brian Jenkins, *International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict,* research paper no. 48, California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy (Los Angeles, Calif.: Crescent Publications, 1974), 4.

5. Richard Clutterbuck, *Guerrillas and Terrorists* (London: Farber and Farber Limited, 1977), 21.

6. Michael T. McEwen, "Psychological Operations Against Terrorism: The Unused Weapon," *Military Review* 66, no. 1 (January 1986): 62.

7. Schlomo Gazit and Michael Handel, "Insurgency, Terrorism and Intelligence," in *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Counterintelligence,* ed. Roy Godson (Washington, D.C.: National Strategy Research Center, 1980), 141.

8. Ibid.

9. *Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism,* 3.

10. Francis P. Hoeber, "Terrorism, Sabotage and Telecommunications," *International Security Review* 7, no. 2 (February 1982): 289.

11. As taken from an interview with a terrorist on the CBS-BBC production entitled "Terrorist International," which aired on *60 Minutes,* 9 March 1976.

12. Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, "Defining Terrorism," *Catholicism in Crisis,* September 1984 (from an address originally presented at the Jonathan Institute's Conference on International Terrorism, Washington, D.C., 25 June 1984), 56.

13. Roberta D. Goren, *The Soviet Union and Terrorism,* ed. Jillian Becker (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984), 14.

14. Brian Jenkins, *New Modes of Conflict* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, June 1983), 6.

15. Kirkpatrick.

16. Clutterbuck, 16.

17. For a discussion of the major characteristics of nonterritorial terrorism see Stephen Sloan, *The Anatomy of Nonterritorial Terrorism: An Analytical Essay,* Clandestine Tactics and Technology Series (Gaithersburg, Md.: The International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1981).

international terrorist group and by a government employing the tactics of international terrorism.

The Iranian seizure of the US embassy was not the traditional "state terrorism" or "enforcement terrorism" of the past aimed at controlling or intimidating the local population.[22] It was directed at a foreign adversary and audience whose representatives were held in captivity. Moreover, beyond their own frontiers such rogue or outlaw states as Iran and Libya have supported nonterritorial terrorist groups as a technique in what can be viewed as a new diplomatic method—"armed diplomacy"—for carrying out foreign policy.[23] To these states, acts of terrorism are as surely a part of this new and perverse diplomacy as the exchange of ambassadors of the past. What we are now witnessing is a variant of the gunboat diplomacy practiced by the major imperial powers during the nineteenth century. Now smaller states can threaten major powers with relative impunity; and when and if these rogue states and the terrorist groups they support achieve a nuclear capability, they can engage in a form of intimidation undreamed in the past.

It is therefore important that in the development of a counterterrorism doctrine and capability, emphasis be placed in a broader political context than the use of force; and it must also be recognized that terrorism is a manifestation of the changing nature of war. For as Brian Jenkins perceptively notes in placing the tragedy of Lebanon* in a broader comparative perspective: "The conflict in Lebanon is likely to be representative of armed conflict worldwide in the last quarter of the twentieth century: a mixture of conventional warfare, classic guerrilla warfare, and campaigns of terrorism, openly fought and secretly waged, often without regard to national frontiers, by armies, as well as irregular forces, directly or indirectly."[24]

If the United States is to develop an offensive doctrine of counterterrorism, it must learn to fight a new form of warfare in which it may not be able to draw on the experiences of the past.

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*23 October 1983: Suicide truck bomb killed 241 Marines at the Marine compound, Beirut, Lebanon.

ticular has supported client states who in turn have trained and equipped various groups to use terrorism as a form of "indirect aggression" that can challenge Washington's global strategic position. This is not to suggest that Moscow is behind the unified "terror network,"[19] but it serves to underscore how the Soviet Union has employed terrorism as a strategic weapon through the use of "active measures [which] constitute a dynamic and integrated array of overt and covert techniques for influencing events and behavior in, and actions of, foreign countries."[20]

To the USSR, terrorism is not narrowly defined as simply a form of violence. It is placed within a very broad spectrum of political warfare and armed conflict that ranges from overt and covert propaganda to "paramilitary operations, composed of a wide variety of Soviet activities in support of terrorist groups and insurgent movements."[21] Terrorism is therefore an offensive weapon in what is ultimately a systematic campaign of intensive political conflict. It is just one element in an approach that integrates the tactics and strategies of political and armed conflict. In combating terrorism, the United States will have to address whether it can develop its own variation of "active measures," Soviet style, as one means of taking the offensive against terrorist groups and their state sponsors.

If the Soviet Union has employed terrorism as a way of avoiding the technological nightmare of nuclear war, other states have used it to compensate for the preponderance of military power held by Washington and Moscow. The seizure of the hostages in Iran points to another ominous characteristic of modern terrorism: states are not only sponsoring terrorist groups but are emulating their tactics as an instrument of foreign policy. It is not significant in the Iranian case that the act may have been initiated by nongovernmental groups. What is important is that holding those Americans in Iran became a state-sanctioned and state-sponsored terrorist act employed as a means of dramatizing a cause and attempting to pressure a more powerful state to overreact or acquiesce to a number of demands. The Iranians were highly successful. The title of the American Broadcasting Company's long running coverage of the incident, "America Held Hostage," effectively conveyed the similarity between an act conducted by an