



DEFEATING TERRORISM

STRATEGIC ISSUE ANALYSIS



Terrorism: Sounding Roland's Horn Across the Atlantic

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Conclusions:

- Continue an active information campaign in Europe to sustain the anti-terrorism coalition.
- Make the Middle East peace process a transatlantic initiative with a major role for Europe.
- Contribute an IBCT to the Eurocorps.
- Sell or lease C-17 and RO/RO ships to the EU.
- Contribute to the maturation of the Eurocorps.

The United States cannot defeat global terrorism without support from its friends and allies. Europe plays center stage in the counterterrorism campaign. A disinterested Europe can only assist terrorism. As an active U.S. ally, Europe can provide resources, expertise, and access to terrorist citadels, while at the same time strangulating the terrorist cells thriving on its soil. Not surprisingly, the United Kingdom provided immediate, unwavering support for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and requires no further edification. Continental Europe is a different matter altogether. Europe's political will and military capabilities can be problematic. The United States must not only understand and allay Europe's fears, but also come to terms with its limited military capabilities. The United States needs to awaken Europe's incredible potential and shape European security for the new millennium.

European Perspective.

The September 11 terrorist attack on the United States outraged Europeans, but not in the same manner as it did Americans. Although currently united in principal with the United States to defeat the al Qaeda terrorist network, political will and consensus are likely to wane as Operation ENDURING FREEDOM protracts. This paradox is best explained by seeing how Europeans view terrorism.

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in Europe. In fact, it is interwoven in the tapestry of its modern history. The terrorist activities of the Serbian Black Hand against the Austro-Hungarian Empire in Bosnia-Herzegovina, culminating in the assassi-

nation of Archduke Ferdinand, were the catalyst to World War I. In the interwar period, terrorism was rampant in Germany, Russia, and France as various groups vied for power. The terror bombings during World War II reduced the major cities of Europe to rubble. The Cold War spawned a host of terrorist organizations that seemed to vie with each other for sanguinary publicity. If Europeans are not inured by terrorism, they certainly are numbed by and fearful of it.

Of all the instruments of power to be employed in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, a prominent military option is likely to be the most contentious with Europeans. The arguments against the use of military force would expound the following themes: terrorism does not threaten the survival of the state—the military is the wrong instrument of power; Operation ENDURING FREEDOM appears to be an open-ended obligation—fear of military adventurism; a military conflict will result in collateral damage—alienation of indigenous populations and added impetus to the terrorist movements; the conflict could easily escalate into a full-fledged war; a long-term war would have severe economic consequences; and because of its geographic proximity to the Middle East and Magreb, Europe is particularly vulnerable to terrorist retaliation from the Muslim community. Although Europeans are not likely to condemn covert operations and discrete military strikes, they do see law enforcement as the primary means of fighting this conflict.

As a backdrop to these fears, many European commentators enjoy counseling against rash action. The common theme is that terrorism is a symptom of poverty, imperialism, great power arrogance, disen-

franchised citizenry, and so on—each a possible root to the conflict. Extending their argument, they offer a reasoned approach to resolving the conflict—pacifism, appeasement, international laissez-faire, and modus vivendi. Even though the extent of their influence is not known, such talk does reach a sympathetic ear with Europeans. As the United States learned during the Kosovo conflict, consensus is not a strong suit with Europeans. Given the nebulous nature of a counterterrorism campaign, European consensus regarding tactics, strategy, and objectives is equally not likely.

Fortunately, the U.S. initial approach has impressed the Europeans. One of the greatest concerns following the wake of the terrorist attacks was that the United States would use a “cowboy” approach—shooting first and asking questions later. To the European Union’s relief, the U.S. measured approach and decision to build a counterterrorism coalition have allayed fears and muted criticism. But the United States must go further.

In order to maintain solidarity and consensus with Europe, the United States needs to conduct an active information campaign in Europe. Ambassadors, defense attachés, and TRADOC senior liaison officers must present the U.S. rationale with public statements and articles regarding the campaign strategy. The U.S. State Department should encourage American commentators to appear on European talk shows and news programs. These actions would present the American perspective without the European editorial filter. The problems associated with misstatements and contradictory assertions are small in comparison to the biases that permeate the European media. Without continued dialogue, Europe will lose focus and assume a disinterested posture as the conflict extends over the months and years.

Military Capabilities.

Even if the European allies maintain solidarity, their military capabilities are currently insufficient to meet the demands of the imminent conflict. In pursuit of the post-Cold War peace dividend, every European state downsized its armed forces with insufficient, concomitant reforms. Moreover, they made virtually no investments in defense modernization. The armed forces may be smaller, but their divisions are still heavy. With little air- and sealift capabilities, European power projection is still confined to road and rail.

These military discrepancies became woefully apparent during the Kosovo Campaign in 1999,

particularly in the realm of avionics, electronic warfare, precision munitions, and C4SIR. NATO’s resultant Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), which provides a roadmap for correcting the deficiencies, is a slow, expensive process—something none of the European states seems willing to shoulder.

The conflict will not have a negative impact on NATO enlargement. The campaign against global terrorism has had a unifying effect and is likely to accelerate the desire to increase membership among NATO members and candidates. In times of regional instability, states seek greater security. The danger lies in accelerating the process beyond NATO’s capability to assimilate new partners. NATO should resist this temptation and continue with its thoughtful, measured approach to enlargement.

Despite European proclamations of the Eurocorps being ready by 2003, a more realistic appraisal is 2010. Lack of funding is the main but not the only culprit. Actual troop contributions are below the minimum requirements, the provisional corps headquarters appears mired in nascency, corps combat service support is nonexistent, and the issue of consensus, which has haunted every European defense initiative in the past, is not likely to be resolved any time soon. Furthermore, sufficient strategic air- and sealift capabilities are unlikely to be realized by the end of the decade.

One bright light does shine, however. European Special Operating Forces (SOF) appear to be the most appealing and readily available for employment. Thus far, only the United Kingdom has deployed its Special Air Service (SAS) into Afghanistan along with U.S. forces. Germany is hotly debating whether to authorize the deployment of its Division for Special Operations, composed of a Special Forces Detachment (KSK) and two airborne brigades. The KSK currently numbers 400 out of an authorized strength of 1,000, and the airborne brigades comprise approximately 6,000 paratroopers. The airborne brigades also have K9 platoons for tracking humans as well as sniffing out explosives and mines. France also has a robust SOF capability and, unlike Germany, has plenty of experience. Additionally, several other European countries have SOF, although not as large. In aggregate, Europe possesses a significant SOF capability and, because of its covert nature, the various European countries are likely to contribute these forces with alacrity upon a U.S. request.

Not to be overlooked, Germany, France, Austria, and Italy possess mountain brigades, which can provide enormous assistance in mountain warfare.

These brigades are actually the elite forces of their respective ground forces and would be indispensable to any mountain operation. At the very least, their alpine specialists could be attached to the SOF as technical and tactical experts.

Given the penurious military budgets, European militaries are not likely to improve in the near term. The United States can expect financial, infrastructure, combat service support, and discrete personnel participation without reservations, but, given the European propensity to muddy the waters of consensus, it would be more beneficial to the coalition initially to request specific capabilities (SOF, mountain experts, naval, and airpower) under U.S. operational control, rather than a blanket commitment of forces as authorized under NATO's Article 5.

Energizing Europe's Potential .

The United States can recommend a number of initiatives, which would allow Europeans to take an active part in the counterterrorism campaign. European versions of the television show, *America's Most Wanted*, would greatly assist governments in identifying and capturing wanted terrorists; HUMINT is still the most powerful resource for intelligence. Government subsidies will ensure that these shows remain on the air. In this manner, Europe can flush out the terrorist nests and organized crime.

A few European countries have lax drug enforcement laws. Since drugs (especially heroin) are a major source of revenue for terrorist organizations, an anti-drug campaign must address this link. Suggested themes are: "Drug money lines the pockets of terrorists," "For terrorists, needles have two shots—one in the arm and one in the back," and "A moment of pleasure can bring a lifetime of grief—don't give terrorists a chance." Such efforts have a patriotic appeal and should curtail drug sales.

As an enduring incentive to deprive terrorists of funds, European countries should take the money from frozen terrorist financial accounts and apply it to their own counterterrorist initiatives, funding the coalition, or compensation for the destruction wrought by terrorists. Terrorists and their financial supporters can pay by more than one means for their crimes against humanity.

The time is ripe for an integrated European Intelligence Agency, perhaps under the aegis of Europol. Such an initiative would greatly enhance intelligence sharing, coordination of assets and effort, and greater powers to apprehend terrorists and organized crime. Such an agency may be harder

to establish than an American would think. Given the recent history of secret police (KGB, Gestapo, Stasi), Europeans will be very wary of any organization with overarching powers. In any case, it is time to debate the issue.

In a related issue, greater cohesion is needed among law enforcement agencies. In order to defeat the terrorist network, close cooperation and sharing of information among allies are crucial. Because of the various legal systems involved, domestic law enforcement agencies have greater or lesser access to information. Information or evidence shared from some allied agencies can assist domestic agencies gather probable cause against criminal/terrorist elements operating in their countries. Few law enforcement agencies like to share information; the State Department will need to initiate the process in order for it to gain momentum.

European countries have considerable access to and influence with their former colonies. In fact, their relations are more cooperative than adversarial. The United States should allow these European countries to supplement its efforts with regional consensus building, intelligence gathering, and diplomacy. Every actor in the Middle East believes that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be resolved before progress against terrorism can be made. Given their connections, Europeans are better placed to take the lead in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The United States need not abandon the peace process, but it should make it a transatlantic initiative.

It is never too early to secure agreements for use of rail, air bases, sea ports, facilities (medical, fuel storage, warehouses, and so on), and over-flights from all relevant NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) members. Such arrangements provide greater flexibility as shifts in priorities and use of force change during the campaign. Land access to future theaters of conflict will allow NATO and PfP nations to participate by deploying heavy units by rail. Lastly, access agreements are easier to secure in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks than later in the conflict.

Shaping the European Security and Defense Policy .

The European Security and Defense Policy may be moribund, at least as a separate entity from NATO. The current conflict exemplifies the reality of the Alliance—that no conflict or crisis should be handled unilaterally. Success in modern conflicts requires consensus building, unity of effort, and

unity of command. A contingency does not necessarily need the active participation of every member of the Alliance, but it should require the involvement of each member in some capacity.

The United States needs to take a greater role in shaping Europe's defense capabilities. Conceptually, the Eurocorps has the greatest potential to contribute to this type of conflict, but without U.S. leadership, it is doomed to remain a paper tiger. America is very good at establishing consensus and building coalitions. In a practical sense, the creation of the Eurocorps is a permanent coalition.

First, NATO must secure national contributions for the corps headquarters, the combat service support units, and the ground forces, as well as the air and naval squadrons. Due to their unique character, multinational divisions allow both large and small countries to contribute forces within their means, ranging in size of a specialized company to a brigade. America's contribution to the ground forces could be an Interim Brigade Combat Team. The Eurocorps should be open to NATO, EU, and PfP countries, but upon alert, must fall under NATO's command authority. Contributing nations would have the option of not deploying their Eurocorps-designated units if it is not in their interest. The depth of the Eurocorps would not suffer from the nonparticipation of a few.

Second, in order to fill the air- and sealift vacuum, the United States could sell or lease C-17 transports and RO/RO ships to the European Union until its own production capabilities bear fruit. This phase-in/phase-out approach assures that the Eurocorps establishes a power projection capability within a short time.

Third, the Eurocorps allows the contributing countries to focus resources in order to fulfill the DCI. As the Eurocorps is to be a modern force, NATO must attain consensus on standardization of equipment. Either this initiative can be accomplished by a consortium and/or by national contracts. In this manner, newer members with current, obsolete equipment can buy or lease equipment without shouldering an enormous financial burden. This approach enhances interoperability and keeps combat service support at manageable levels.

Fourth, NATO establishes a train-up and certification timeline in order to establish milestones for progress. By instituting a train-to-standard attitude and a sequential collective training schedule, the Eurocorps can be operational within 2-3 years of its establishment.

Lastly, the mission of the Eurocorps does not need to deviate from the Petersberg Tasks. All the tasks contribute to the ultimate objectives of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. The basic organization of the Eurocorps is sound, and the proposed 5,000-man police force is a superb idea and helps bridge the capabilities gap between military and law enforcement. The Eurocorps can be rounded out with a Special Forces detachment that can deploy into a crisis region weeks or months in advance of the Eurocorps. The inclusion of a Special Forces group with each member contributing its own forces would greatly enhance the capabilities of the Eurocorps.

The New Vision.

If the United States is the global policeman, then Europe surely should be its deputy. The United States must awaken Europe to the insidious dangers of terrorism by changing how it views terrorism and infusing it with the resolve to take action. Although its military means are currently limited, Europe does have specific forces which can make an important, immediate contribution. Lastly, the Eurocorps has the potential to allow Europe to assume a greater security role in the world without shouldering heavy military expenditures. The Islamic terrorists thought they would cow and divide the world, instead they have revitalized the transatlantic link.



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